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Credit Discrimination Against
Women: Causes and Solutions
MargaretJ. Gates*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected
by any of the duties, complications and incapacities arising
out of the married state, but these are exceptions to the
general rule. The paramount destiny and mission of women
are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil
society must be adapted to the general constitution of
things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.'
Although the "general constitution of things" has changed
since the Supreme Court denied Myra Bradwell admission to the
bar, the above rationale concerning married women is regularly
used, if not articulated, in denying women equal credit opportunity.
In the face of hard evidence to the contrary, many creditors assume
that virtually all women will marry, have children, leave the work
force, and therefore fail to meet their financial obligations.
When women marry they become economic nonentities in the
eyes of the credit establishment; when they are subsequently divorced or widowed they emerge as unknowns in an increasingly
credit oriented society. This pattern occurs whether or not a wife
works outside the home or is, in fact, the principal wage earner in
her family. The current campaign for equal credit opportunity acknowledges that the wife who does not work outside her home is
nevertheless an equal partner in the economic unit of her marriage,
but it recognizes that unless she has property or income of her own
* Co-Director, Center for Women Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.; Assistant Professorial Lecturer, National Law Center, George Washington University. B.A. 1958, University
of Maryland; M.A. 1966, Instituto Technologico de Monterrey, Mexico; J.D. 1971, Georgetown University Law Center. The assistance of Nancy Polikoff is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Bradewell v. The State, 83 U.S. (15 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1872).
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she will not be considered creditworthy. 2 It focuses primarily on the
working wife because a woman who works for wages, often in addition to caring for a home and children, should have the same opportunity to obtain credit or a loan as does a man.
This article deals both with the laws that cause credit discrimination against women and with those that have been and could be
formulated to solve the problem. It first explains the nature and
importance of the problem, then discusses the apparent legal and
economic bases of the discrimination, and finally explores the adequacy of existing and proposed remedies.
II.

THE PROBLEM

The availability of credit to women is vital to the upgrading of
their economic status because it determines their access to education,3 homeownership, entrepreneurship, and investment, as well as
their ability to provide for the more immediate needs of their families.
It is the married, or formerly married, woman who appears to
be the prime victim of sex discrimination in credit. As a result, the
female-headed household and the family with a working wife are
most affected; and disproportionately so affected are black and
other minority families.'
Based on testimony which it heard in May 1972 the National
Commission on Consumer Finance (NCCF) found that women have
more difficulty than5 men in obtaining credit and identified these
five problem areas:
2. Those community property states (Arizona, New Mexico, Washington) that have
recently amended their laws so as to provide husband and wife with equal management and
control rights over the community have made it possible, for the first time, for a nonworking
wife to be considered creditworthy. Although her contribution to the community is services
and not income, she has power to obligate the community without her husband's consent.
See Appendix A.
3. In addition to other credit problems discussed in this article, women obtain fewer
loans for educational purposes. In 53 out of the 54 jurisdictions participating in the federal
Guaranteed Student Loan Program, women have received fewer loans than men. For example, in Alabama male-female distribution is 63.8-35.6; in Arizona 79.2-20.6; in California 70.429.4; in Illinois 77.9-21.8; in New York 63.2-36.7; in Utah 79.1-20.8. HEW, REPORT OF THE
GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM, DISTRIBUTION OF CUMULATIVE LOANS AS OF JUNE

30, 1972

(May 14, 1973).
4. "The problems faced by the woman who heads a household are particularly acute if
the woman is black, and 27 percent of women heading households are black." ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

108 (1973).

5. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES
152-53 (1972), reprintedin CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE No. 215 (1973).
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1. Single women have more trouble obtaining credit than single men. (This
appeared to be more characteristic of mortgage credit than of consumer
credit.)
2. Creditors generally require a woman upon marriage to reapply for credit,
usually in her husband's name. Similar reapplication is not asked of men when
they marry.
3. Creditors are often unwilling to extend credit to a married woman in her
own name.
4. Creditors are often unwilling to count the wife's income when a married
couple applies for credit.
5. Women who are divorced or widowed have trouble re-establishing credit.
Women who are separated have a particularly difficult time, since the accounts may still be in the husband's name.

The report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs that accompanies the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
listed thirteen specific practices that discriminate on the basis of sex
and/or marital status, the first five of which parallel those documented by the Commission.' Five of the remaining offensive practices result from the unwillingness of creditors to acknowledge the
creditworthiness of a working wife and include: refusing to issue her
an account for which she would be eligible were she not married;
requesting information concerning her husband's creditworthiness
before doing so; considering her a "dependent" of her husband when
calculating his eligibility for credit; applying stricter standards
when the wife rather than the husband is the primary wage-earner;
and altering her credit rating on the basis of her husband's credit
performance. Additionally, the committee cited three other policies
that it considered objectionable: the arbitrary refusal to consider
alimony and child support as income for credit purposes when the
reliability of the source is subject to verification; requesting information concerning birth control practices when evaluating a credit
application; and finally, the use of credit scoring systems that apply
different numerical values depending on the sex or marital status
of the applicant. Statements before the NCCF and other governmental bodies 7 that document these problems have been largely
anecdotal. The cumulative force, however, when added to hundreds
of unsolicited compliants to women's groups8 and the results of sev6.

SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,

HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, TRUTH IN LENDING

AcT

S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1973).
7. See Testimony before the FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation(Dec. 19-20, 1972);
CREDIT REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (Oct. 31, 1973);
Hearingson Discriminationin FinanceBefore the Governor's Commission on Women's Programs of Idaho (May 12, 1972); Testimony of Sharyn Campbell for the Commission on the
Status of Women Before the Economic Development, Manpower and Labor Committee of the
District of Columbia City Council (June 7, 1973).
8. See Statement of the NationalOrganizationfor Women (NOW), Oversight Hearings
AMENDMENTS,
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eral informal surveys,9 shows that women do have cause to complain."
III.

THE CAUSES

There is no direct evidence that women are poorer credit risks
than men. On the contrary, two studies show that women are more
likely than men to pay their debts." Bankers who have reviewed
their own past accounts for the purpose of developing numerical
credit scoring systems have found that sex is not relevant to risk
determination. 12 Women as a class are economically disadvantaged
on 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81(t) (1970) Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 13, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Oversight Hearings].
9. See Report based on a joint survey of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, Inc. & the
Government of the District of Columbia Commission on the Status of Women, Residential
Mortgage Lending Practices of Commercial Banks, Savings and Loan Associations and Mortgage Bankers (Aug. 1972); Report based on a joint survey of the Women's Legal Defense
Fund, Inc. & the Government of the District of Columbia Commission on the Status of
Women, Credit Policies of Bankers (Aug. 1972); Report based on a joint survey of the
Women's Legal Defense Fund, Inc. & the Government of the District of Columbia Commission on the Status of Women, Credit Policies of Department Stores in the Metropolitan
Washington Area (Aug. 1973); St. Paul Department of Human Rights, Installment Loan
Survey of St. Paul Banks (1972); North Carolina Public Interest Research Group, ShortChanged-Sex Discrimination in Consumer Credit (Oct. 1973); Oregon Student Public
Interest Research Group, No Credit for Women (Feb. 1973).
10. Eugene Adams, then President of the American Banking Association, in a speech
reprinted in The Am. Banker, June 25, 1973, at 22, col. 3 said "I think we have to acknowledge
that banks, along with the rest of the credit industry, do in fact discriminate against women
when it comes to granting credit. The question then becomes, is that discrimination justified?"
11. A study in the mid-1960's, which measured risk on installment credit, found that
for both married and single women the bad account probability was substantially lower than
for men with the same marital status. Smith, Measuring Risk on Installment Credit, 2
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 327-40 (1964). The author of an earlier study concluded: "The classification of borrowers by sex and marital status indicates that women are better credit risks
than men; and the superiority appears to be statistically significant." D. DURAND, Risk
Element in Consumer Installment Financing, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH,
TECHNICAL EDITION 74 (1941). Similar results were reported by the director of an organization
providing home improvement loans to elderly and low income families. Many of the loans
have gone to women who are heads of households. They as well as the other program beneficiaries were considered high risks and were therefore unable to get conventional financing. The
program has a delinquency rate of only 4%; there have been no foreclosures. Most significantly, of the families headed by women, the delinquency rate is estimated as 2%. The
program's director believes that female-headed families "demonstrate better fiscal responsibility than other households." Letter from Thomas A. Jones, Executive Director, Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc., to Jane Chapman, Co-Director, Center for Women Policy Studies, April 18, 1973.
12. Interviews with James L. Smith, Senior Vice President, Security Pacific National
Bank, in Washington, D.C., June 21, 1973, and Charles F. Hayward, Vice President, First
National City Bank, in New York, N.Y., December 7, 1973.
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in that they have more difficulty finding work,' 3 are paid less for
what they do,' 4 and are generally relegated to jobs with little opportunity for advancement.' 5 This unfortunate fact explains why fewer
women than men obtain loans and credit, but it does not justify the
denial of credit to a woman who, by all objective criteria, is as
qualified as a man who obtains credit. 6
The credit industry has suggested that state laws prevent it
from dealing with women on the same basis as men.' 7 Most of the
laws that have been identified as having this effect, however, do not
apply to women in general, but only to married women. Furthermore, the industry's belief persists in spite of the fact that every
state has a law, usually entitled a Married Women's Property Act,
that was enacted to nullify the common-law disabilities of married
women.' Typically, these statutes provide that wives may contract,
buy and sell property, and conduct business as though they were not
married. Standing alone, these acts would establish the intent of the
legislatures that married women be considered legally capable of
entering into any financial agreement." Nevertheless, other laws are
cited as obstacles to that end. Domestic relations laws requiring
husbands to support their wives, community property laws, and
multiple agreements laws are most often mentioned as adversely
affecting the creditworthiness of married women.
A. Support Laws. In every state husbands are required by law
1.3. Tables of the national employment rates for workers 20 years and over show that
in 1972 5.4% of the women were unemployed as compared to 4.0% of the men. In 1971 the
ratio was 5.7% to 4.4%, in 1970 4.8% to 3.5%, and in 1969 3.7% to 2.1%. MANPOWER REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT 17 (1973).
14. WOMEN'S BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN
WORKERS TODAY 6 (1973).
15. "Women are more apt than men to be white-collar workers, but the jobs they hold
are usually less skilled and pay less than those of men. Women professional workers are most
likely to be teachers, nurses and other health workers, while men are most frequently employed in professions other than teaching and health. Women are less likely than men to be
managers and officials, and are far more likely to be clerical workers." Id. at 5.
16. See Statement ofJaneR. Chapman, Co-Director,Centerfor Women Policy Studies,
Hearings on Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic Comm., 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (July 12, 1973).
17. E.g., Testimony of Matthew Hale, Counsel for the American Bankers Association,
Hearings on the Availability of Credit to Women Before the National Commission on Consumer Finance 3 (May 23, 1972).
18. L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 40 (1969).
19. Maryland, in addition to enacting laws prohibiting discrimination in credit,
amended its Married Woman's Property Act to remove confusion in its interpretation by
adding the following sentence: "The provisions of this section apply to all contractual relations entered into by married or unmarried women, including retail installment sales or retail
credit accounts as defined in Article 83 of this Code." MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 5 (Supp.
1973).
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to support their wives.2" These laws were enacted at a time when
married women did not ordinarily work outside the home and served
the purpose of preventing women from becoming wards of the state.
They affect credit practices by permitting a merchant to sell goods
to a married woman and then look to her husband for payment.2 '
The presumption that the husband is obligated to pay for his
wife's "necessaries" need not stand in the way of her establishing
credit in her own name. A wife can bind herself alone simply by
making it clear in her agreement with the seller that she is undertaking to pay the debt from her separate property. A court is not
apt to disturb such a contract by permitting the creditor to recover
22
against the husband. For example, in Almon v. R. H. Macy & Co.
the court held:
In the absence of the husband's signature we think that the legal consequence
of the document signed only by the wife is to bind the wife separately and to
extend credit solely to her and excludes as a basis of recovery the theory of
agency of the wife to purchase necessaries. This agreement does not purport
to be a contract by the plaintiff to give credit to the husband for the purchase
of necessaries by the wife. The only legal conclusion is that credit was extended
solely to the wife in which case the husband is not liable even for the purchase
of necessaries.?

In twenty-two states creditors have obtained the enactment of
Family Expense Acts. Generally, they make it possible for the creditor to seek payment from either husband or wife for "family expenses" regardless of which spouse made the purchase.2 4 In these states,
at least, it is clear that the law does not prevent a creditor from
collecting from a married woman those debts she has undertaken,
as well as family expenses that her husband has charged.
Quite likely, the reason creditors are reluctant to extend credit
to a married woman is not that they believe it to be inconsistent
with the law or that they fear collection problems. It is more apt to
be that it is expensive for them to open two accounts per family and,
20. These principles of support are largely judge-made, although some states have
codified the common law duty of the husband to support his wife. See H. CLARK, LAW OF
DOMESTIc RELATIONS

182 (1968).

21. When this doctrine arose, married women were under the common-law disability
of being unable to contract, and it was necessary for the protection of creditors that the law
find a way to establish that a wife's purchases would result in a binding contract for payments
between the husband and the creditor.
22. 106 Ga. App. 123, 126 S.E.2d 641 (1962).
23. Id. at 125, 126 S.E.2d at 643. See also Swanson v. Hutzler Bros. Co., 135 A.2d 151
(D.C. 1957); Waxelbaum v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 120 Ga. App. 312, 170 S.E.2d
333 (1969); Saks & Co. v. Nager, 74 Misc. 2d 855, 345 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1973).
24.

See H.

CLARK, LAW

OF DOMESTIc RELTIONS 186-87 (1968).
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as between the husband and the wife, they prefer to deal with the
man.2"
B. Community Property laws. Eight states chose property
systems from the civil codes of continental Europe rather than from
the common law. " The civil law made the husband the manager of
all property acquired by him or his wife during their marriage,2 but
most community property states have modified their laws to allow
married women to control at least their own earnings. 2s These
changes have been recent and are in some cases the result of the
passage of state equal rights amendments. 29 Only in Louisiana is a
woman still not permitted to obligate her own income.'" In California, however, a woman may lose control of her earnings if she commingles them with community property managed exclusively by the
husband.3 ' These laws are, of course, taken into consideration when
32
evaluating the creditworthiness of a married woman.
C. Multiple Agreement Laws. The Report of the National
Commission on Consumer Finance points out that "most state statutes fixing a graduated rate ceiling on consumer credit transactions
usually prohibit the maintenance by creditors of separate accounts
for husband and wife [in order to] minimize the aggregate finance
charge. ' 33 Examples of these statutes are the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code and the Uniform Small Loan Law. Under the UCCC,
with respect to consumer loans whose finance charge exceeds
eighteen percent, "no lender may permit any person, or husband
and wife, to become obligated in any way under more than one loan
25. A spokesman for Sears, Roebuck and Company says that it is very expensive for
Sears to keep 2 accounts for one family and adds, "We discourage married women from
opening their own accounts, but if they push us on it, we'll go along." BUSINESS WEEK, Jan.
12, 1974, at 77.
26. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 et seq. (Supp. 1973); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5124 et seq.
(West 1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-912 et seq. (1963); LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402 et seq. (West
1971); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 123.190, 123.230 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4A-2 et seq.
(1973); TEX. FAMILY CODE § 5.22 (1972); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1972). See
Appendix A.
27. W. DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 322 (1943).
28. See Appendix A.
29. N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 18 (1973); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 3a (1972); WASH. CONST.
art. xxxl, § 1 (1972).
30. LA. ClV. CODE art. 2404 (West 1971).
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5124 (West 1970).
32. In a community property state a woman may maintain control of her earnings and
property that she buys after marriage by making an ante nuptial agreement concerning her
property rights. See e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2325 & art. 2392 (1971).

33. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES 153 (1972), reprinted in CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE No. 215 (Jan.
15, 1973).
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agreement . . . with intent to obtain a higher rate of loan finance
charge than would otherwise be permitted . . . ."I' The Uniform
Small Loan Law, which establishes for small loans maximum rates
of charges in excess of those permitted under usury laws, contains
the following two sections:
Section 13(a). Every licensee hereunder may contract for and receive, on
any loan of money not exceeding $300 in amount, charges at a rate not exceeding 3 percent a month on that part of the unpaid principal balance of any loan
not in excess of $100, and 2 percent a month on any remainder of such unpaid
principal balance. No licensee shall induce or permit any person, nor any
husband or wife, jointly or severally, to become obligated, directly or contingently or both, under more than one contract of loan at the same time, for the
purpose of obtaining a higher rate of charge than would otherwise be permitted
by this section.
Section 15. No licensee shall directly or indirectly charge, contract for, or
receive a greater rate of interest than upon any loan, or upon any part or all
of any aggregate indebtedness of the same person, in excess of $300. The
foregoing prohibition shall also apply to any licensee who permits any husband
and wife, jointly or severally, to owe directly or contingently
or both to the
3
licensee at any time a sum of more than $300 for principal. 1

The purpose of these laws is to prevent creditors, when graduated rate ceilings are applicable, from exacting more interest from
a couple by having two high interest accounts rather than one at a
lower rate. For example, under section 13(a), if a husband borrows
150 dollars, he will pay a rate of three percent a month on one
hundred dollars and two percent a month on fifty dollars. If his wife
were to borrow 150 dollars, she would, without this statute, also pay
three percent on the first one hundred dollars and two percent on
the remaining fifty dollars. If, however, the two loans were treated
as one, as they would have to be under this statute, they would pay
three percent on one hundred dollars and two percent on the remaining 200 dollars. Without such a statute, therefore, creditors
could require separate accounts for husband and wife and thereby
frustrate the rate ceilings imposed by law. While these laws serve
the public interest by protecting consumers from unscrupulous
credit practices, they may have the additional unfortunate effect of
preventing a spouse from having a separate account or loan where
34. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.509. The UCCC has been enacted in Colorado,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming. The multiple agreement provisions
governing credit sales (§ 2.402) and other loans (§ 3.409) do not treat husband and wife as
one person. One commentator believes these omissions to be oversights rather than intentional. W. WILLIER & F. HART, CONSUMER CREDIT HANDBOOK 58 (1969).
35. UNIFORM SMALL LOAN LAW (7th Draft June 1, 1942). Some states enacted § 15 of
the sixth draft, which does not include the provision on husband and wife. See B. CURRAN,
TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION

21 (1966).

19741

WOMEN AND CREDIT

the other spouse has already established credit. This circumstance
falls most heavily on women because it is likely to be the husbands
who have the established credit. The National Commission on Consumer Finance suggests that it is reasonable to permit husband and
wife to have separate accounts if they so wish as long as full disclosure of possible additional costs is provided to them26
D. Divorce and Separation. Another form of discrimination
believed to result from the legal structure is the plight of the divorced woman. In fact, however, this problem arises not from the
law but from a series of sociological factors. Typically, the divorced
woman has relied upon her husband's credit during her marriage;
when she applies for her own charge accounts or a loan she is, as
they say in the credit business, a "new face." If she is not fully
employed and relies in part upon alimony or child support to meet
the creditor's income requirements, she will probably be refused.
Such payments by husbands are considered unreliable" even
though in an individual case they may have been made regularly
over a long period of time.
Many creditors deny accounts to divorced people because they
believe that they are generally unstable and less reliable than married or never-married persons." This belief is probably based on
36. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES 153 (1972), reprinted in CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE No. 215 (Jan.
15, 1973).
37. The Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women, in its January 1972 memorandum, The Equal Rights Amendment and Alimony and Child Support Laws, cited one
study which showed that within one year after the divorce decree, 38% of the husbands were
in full compliance with the support order. The figure dropped to 28% for the second year,
26' for the third, 22% for the fourth, 19% for the fifth, and 17% for years 6 through 9. Such
figures would indicate that those husbands who continued support payments for 6 years after
the court order would continue steadily for the next few years.
:38. For example, a report, Credit Study by the Missouri Commission on the Status of
Women, done in 1973 states:
With respect to men obligated to pay their ex-wives court ordered support, alimony was
considered a debt which reduced their income for credit purposes. This rationale did not
follow through, however, with respect to the women who receive such support from their
ex-husbands. For credit purposes from a woman's point of view, not only is alimony not
considered "income," but it is also deducted as a liability, since, according to one bank
officer, it is uncertain to continue. The result of this policy is discriminatory against both
divorced women and men. For example, if a divorced man earns $10,000 per year and
pays support of $2,000 per year, his income, assuming he has no other fixed debts, would
be $8,000. On the other hand, a divorced woman who works and receives a salary of
$8,000 per year and alimony of $2,000 per year, would have an income of only $6,000 for
purposes of credit, whereas under the Missouri and federal tax laws, she would be treated
as having an income of $10,000 per year. The incredible explanation for this computation
was that a woman would become accustomed to living on her salary plus the alimony
and would have to make up those expenses from her regular salary when the alimony
ceased.
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experience with divorced men, since so few previously married
women have credit. At least one bank has learned from studying its
own experience that divorced women are good risks but a divorced
man is twice as likely to default than a married man." Nevertheless,
the burden of this policy falls most heavily on women. A man need
not notify his creditors of his change in marital status, but a woman,
opening her own accounts for the first time will be required to state
that she is newly divorced.
Divorced and separated women suffer the results of having been
actually or ostensibly financially dependent on their husbands. If
they have never supported themselves and are unable to do so, they
may be justifiably denied credit. If, however, they have worked and
contributed to the family income but failed to establish themselves
as an independent economic entity in the credit market, they are
likely to be treated unfairly when they try to develop a credit record
as a divorced person. 0 It is for this reason that married women are
now insisting on having accounts in their own names and credit
bureau records separate from their husbands'."
IV.

SOLUTIONS

The above summary of the causes of credit discrimination
against women is incomplete and oversimplified, but it is sufficient
to indicate that there is no easy solution to the problem. Sex discrimination, like racial discrimination, is deeply rooted and persists
in the face of strong governmental policy and implementing legislation to the contrary. 2 Still, an attempt must be made to change all
the conditions that contribute to the disadvantaged economic status
of women. There are two major avenues of reform through law. State
laws that give rise to the problem can be amended, and nondiscriminatory treatment can be mandated at the state and/or federal level.
A. Amendment of State Laws. It is unlikely that significant
reform will be effected through the amendment of state laws. Not
39. Interview with Charles Hayward, Vice President, First National City Bank, in New
York, N.Y. December 7, 1973.
40. See Campbell, Women and Credit, in MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
WOMEN 1 (1973).
41. In 1973 The Baltimore Women's Law Center, in cooperation with the Baltimore
City Women's Political Caucus, succeeded in negotiating a policy change on the part of the
Credit Bureau of Baltimore which will now, upon request, maintain a separate file for each

spouse.
42. This fact is evidenced by the experience of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission in enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race or sex.
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only do many of the laws commonly believed to inhibit the extension of credit not in fact do so, but also, such statutes are confined
to a few states. Moreover, since such statutes frequently serve some
other public interest, they are not likely to be repealed.
Laws that require a husband to support his wife should not
prevent a creditor from extending credit to a married woman in her
own name. Nevertheless, because some state courts might interpret
them to be an obstacle, it is helpful to know that the equal rights
amendment 3 (ERA) to the Constitution, if ratified, will require that
support laws be rewritten so that they do not discriminate on the
basis of sex.44
Community property laws will also be affected by the ERA45
and have already undergone change in states that have enacted
equal rights amendments to their own constitutions.46 Arizona has
completely revised its community property laws to give women
equal management powers even though it has not enacted an equal
rights amendment."
State property laws that favor one spouse over the other are
subject to challenge in federal courts. In Reed v. Reed,48 the Supreme Court struck down an Idaho statute4 9 that provided for a
mandatory preference of men over women when persons of equal
relation to an intestate decedent apply for appointment as administrator of the estate. The Court posed the issue, whether a rational
basis exists between the difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration and the state objective of reduc43. The operative language reads: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex." H.R.J. RES. 208, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Ras. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
44. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 944-46 (1971). The following
states, however, have Equal Rights provisions in their own Constitutions, and there is no
indication that these provisions have altered domestic relations law: ALASKA CONST. art. 1,
§ 3; CoLo. CONST. art. 2, § 29; HAWAII CONST. art. 1, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18; MD. CONST.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 46; N.M. CONsT. art. 2, § 18 (Supp. 1973); PA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 27 (Supp. 1973); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 3a (Supp. 1974); UTAH CONST. art. 4, § 1; VA. CONST.
art. 1, § 11; WASH. CONST. amend. 61; Wyo. CONsT. art. 1, §§ 2, 3, art. 6, § 1.
45. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 44, at 946-49.
46. In Washington and in New Mexico, with the exception in the latter state of commercial community personal property, the wife shares with the husband equal management,
control and disposition rights over community property. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4A-7.1 to -8
(Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1972).
47. ARiz. REV. STAT ANN. § 25-214 (Supp. 1973).
48. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
49. IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (1948) provided: "Preferences.-Of several persons claiming
and equally entitled to administer, males must be preferred to females, and relatives of the
whole to those of the half blood."
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ing the workload of its probate courts by eliminating a hearing. The
Court held that:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to
make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said
as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this
context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."'

Laws conclusively vesting the management of community property
in the husband rather than the wife seem to be similar violations of
the equal protection clause. 5'
Multiple agreement laws, which prevent women from opening
accounts or obtaining loans from creditors with whom their husbands have already established credit, are not being revised. Because these laws do operate in the public interest, attempts to repeal
them would likely meet opposition. Moreover, it should not be expected that any or all of these changes would substantially correct
the difficulties women face in obtaining credit. For example, in the
past two years Washington has not only revised its community property law and enacted a state equal rights amendment, but has, in
addition, passed a comprehensive credit law.5"
B. State Laws ProhibitingDiscriminationin CreditPractices.
Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia now have laws
prohibiting sex discrimination in the extension of credit; most of
these states also prohibit marital status discrimination.13 Because
the majority of these laws were enacted less than a year ago, it is
difficult to evaluate their effectiveness at this time, but a few observations can be made.
Many of these state laws do not prohibit all the types of discrimination identified in Part II. For example, the statutes of six
states apply only to sex discrimination and therefore might not be
interpreted to include some of the offensive practices that affect
married women. 4 The West Virginia law applies only to public ac50. 404 U.S. at 76-77.
51. Bilbe, Constitutionalityof Sex-Based Differentiationsin the LouisianaCommunity
PropertyRegime, 19 LOYOLA L. REV. 373 (1972-73).
52. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1972) (property); WASH. REV. CoDEANN.
ch. 141, § 5 (Supp. 1973), amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60 (1962) (credit); WASH.
CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (equal rights amendment).
53. See Appendix B.
54. Alaska, Kansas, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and West Virginia. Both Colorado and
Minnesota have separate statutes for consumer credit and home financing. Marital status is
covered only under the home financing statutes. See Appendix B.
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commodations, 5' and the Illinois law covers only retail credit or
credit cards." Nine state nondiscrimination statutes apply to public
accommodations and expressly or implicitly cover only some credit
57
establishments.
The enforcement provisions of these laws fall into two basic
categories: those that extend a private right of action for damages;58
and those that provide for an administrative remedy. 59 The Oregon,
Washington, Massachusetts, and District of Columbia laws include
both provisions and permit the complainant to choose which to
pursue. Three states explicitly provide for injunctive relief in addition to one of the above remedies, 0 and Wisconsin has a criminal
sanction of a 1,000-dollar fine instead of the right to a civil action.
The Illinois law was enacted without any enforcement provisions.
Six states provide for attorneys' fees and/or court costs6 and punitive damages may be awarded in Oregon and Florida.
C. Existing Federal Remedies. Unlike the reform of property
laws, legal prohibitions against discriminatory credit practices do
not have to be left to the states. The federal government has legislative authority under the commerce clause to control credit practices.12 Prior to a discussion of proposed federal legislation, it is
useful to explore existing federal remedies in order to assess their
adequacy and the consequent need for legislation.
1. ConstitutionalLitigation. At least one suit, Hoberman v.
Manufacturers' Hanover Trust Co.,6 3 has been filed64 in a federal
court challenging the discriminatory credit practice of discounting
a married woman's income for the purpose of computing family
income for a home mortgage. The cause of action in Hoberman arose
in New York where at that time the Executive Law forbade sex, but
not marital-status, discrimination by banks in mortgage lending
55. Although discrimination in the granting of mortgage credit by banks can usually
be covered under a public accommodations statute, language in the West Virginia law suggests that discrimination on the basis of sex in home financing is not prohibited. W. VA. CODE
§ 5-11-2 (1971).
56. ILL. Pun. AcT 78-839, § Ia, amending ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121 1/2,§ 385.
57. Alaska, District of Columbia, Kansas, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia. See Appendix B.
58. California, Colorado, Florida, Texas, Utah. See Appendix B.
59. Alaska, Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, West Virginia. See Appendix B.
60. California, Utah, Washington. See Appendix B.
61. Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Oregon, Texas, Washington. See Appendix B.
62. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970).
63. Civil No. 73-3279 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 26, 1973).
64. The case had not reached trial at the time of this writing.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

and provided an administrative remedy. 5 Plaintiff's attorneys, however, preferred the forum of a federal district court to the cumbersome state administrative process. 6 Plaintiffs allege discrimination
on the basis of sex in violation of the fourteenth and fifth amendments, and an important threshhold issue is whether sufficient state
and federal involvement to raise claims under these amendments
exists. 7 Plaintiffs are expected to argue that because the defendant
bank's activities are regulated by both state and federal agencies,
the requisite "state action" is present. Assuming that state action
will be found, the Hoberman decision will turn on whether defendant's justifications for discounting the income of a married woman
can withstand the degree of scrutiny tha the court chooses to apply
to a classification according to sex. 6
2. Regulation by FederalAgencies. The issue being litigated
in Hoberman is subject to regulation by several federal agencies. On
December 17, 1973, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board published
a policy statement concerning nondiscrimination by its member
organizations. 7" The guidelines required that "[e]ach loan applicant's credit worthiness . . . be evaluated on an individual basis
without reference to presumed characteristics of a group,"'" and
they specifically discourage the discounting of a working wife's income. 7 The Board found that "such discrimination is contrary to
65. New York Executive Law § 296(5) (e) (McKinney 1972), repealed by Act of Feb.
6, 1974, Bill No. A-9359, that specifically prohibits arbitrary discounting of a married
woman's income.
66. Spokeswoman for the feminist law firm of Bellamy, Blank, Goodman, Kelly, Ross
and Stanley, which represents plaintiffs and has received a foundation grant to litigate in the
area of sex discrimination in credit.
67. Plaintiffs claim jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1343. They have
pleaded violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983. The court is asked to find state action
for the purposes of § 1983 in the regulation of the bank by the New York State Banking
Department and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
68. While the requisite state action might be found in the case of a bank or savings and
loan association, it is doubtful that other types of creditors could be reached on constitutional
grounds. But see, The Discredited American Woman: Sex Discriminationin Consumer
Credit, 6 CALIF. DAvIs L. REV. 61, 78-79 (1973).
69. The Supreme Court in its most recent application of the Equal Protection Clause
to a sex discrimination case was divided as to whether the "rational basis" test or the "suspect
classification" test should be employed. The majority found that even under the most lenient
test the Air Force regulation denying to dependents of servicewomen benefits granted to
dependents of servicemen was unconstitutional. Four Justices, however, did adopt the "suspect classification" test saying that sex discrimination, like racial discrimination, must be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
70. 38 Fed. Reg. 34653 (1973). The FHLBB regulates all federally chartered savings and
loan associations as well as many other institutions. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1437-42 (1970).
71. 38 Fed. Reg. 34653 (1973).
72. Id.
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the principle of, and may in fact violate, constitutional provisions
which guarantee equal protection of the law for all persons. '' 3 Although it has no legislative mandate to deal specifically with sex
discrimination, the Board said that it had issued the guidelines on
discounting married women's income under its authority to enforce
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,11 which prohibits discrimination in housing against minority groups, because "a larger proportion of minority group families rely on the wife's income to afford
7' 5
housing and other necessities.
Other financial regulatory agencies-the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Comptroller of the Currency-have been
asked to issue rules prohibiting sex discrimination in lending policies.7 1 The FDIC held hearings in December 1972 to consider the
need for and'its authority to issue such regulations. Although more
than a year has elapsed, the FDIC has not yet announced its decision as to either issue.
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA)77 and the Veterans
Administration (VA)78 provide mortgage insurance or guarantees for
housing-related loans with low down payments. In 1965 the FHA
revised its underwriting manual to include the following liberalized
policy with respect to a wife's income:
The principal element of mortgage risk in allowing the income of working wives
as effective income is the possibility of its interruption by maternity leave.
Most employers recognize this possibility and provide for maternity leave, with
job retention, as an inducement of employment. With strong motives for returning to work any failure to do so after maternity leave would probably be
due to causes which would be unpredictable and would represent such a very
small percentage of volume that it could be accepted as a calculated risk'
73. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 3601-31 (1970).
75. 38 Fed. Reg. 34653 (1973).
76. In February and March 1972 the Center for National Policy Review filed comments
on behalf of 30 civil rights and public interest groups with all these agencies arguing that the
agencies have authority under the Constitution and the Housing Act of 1949 to promulgate
regulations prohibiting sex discrimination. A petition for rulemaking was also filed before the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by the Institute for Public Interest Representation of the Georgetown University Law Center, May 15, 1973.
77. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1702-06(d) (1970). The FHA, an agency of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, insures a variety of housing related loans whose loan-to-value ratios
are low and are, therefore, more subject to default than those in which a large down payment
has been made.
78. 38 U.S.C. §§ 201-44 (1970). The VA provides mortgage insurance on low down
payment loans as well as other benefits to veterans.
79. VII FHA Underwriting Manual, Home Mortgages, § 71924.
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In 1970 the FHA counted all of the wife's income in ninety-one percent of the loans actually extended for new single-family homes."0
The percentage of applicants who were rejected as the result of discounting the wife's income is not known.
The VA, on the other hand, persisted until mid-1973 in a more
restrictive policy8 ' and, in addition, obtained considerable adverse
publicity because in order to comply with VA guidelines lenders
were demanding affidavits from wives stating that they were practicing birth control and did not intend to have children.8 2 A VA
circular dated July 18, 1973, urged lenders to adopt a new policy:
In consideration of present day social and economic patterns, the Veterans
Administration will hereafter recognize in full both the income and expenses
of the veteran and spouse in determining ability to repay a loan obligation. VA
regional offices have been instructed that there shall not be any discounting
of income on account of sex or marital status in making such determination.,

The federal secondary mortgage markets-the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)5 ' and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC)85 -issued nondiscriminatory underwriting guidelines for use in their conventional mortgage purchase programs in 1971. The contract of FNMA (Fannie Mae) includes a warranty that the seller of the mortgage did not discriminate against the mortgagor on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, sex, age, or national origin, but it does not include marital
status. 8 The FNMA also requires that, with respect to a wife's
income, "[tihe key determination to be made is whether the circumstances reasonably indicate that the income, jointly or severally, will continue in a manner sufficient to liquidate the debt under
80. The Center for National Policy Review, The Catholic University of America, School
of Law, Washington, D.C., Memorandum to the VA, VA's Restrictive Credit PracticesComparative Analysis with Policies of Other Federal Agencies (April 1973).
81. DVB Manual M-26-1, Ch. 5, § IV, 5.11c(5) stated that a wife's income could be
"considered" if facts indicated that it was reasonable to conclude that her employment would
continue in the "foreseeable future."
82. E.g., Wife Says Loan Tied to No-Child Vow, Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1973 at A1. In an information bulletin entitled Wives'Income (DVB 1B 26-73-1, Feb. 2,1973), the VA
said it did not require or condone solicitation of such affidavits.
83. DVB Circular 23-73-24, July 18, 1973, announcing Change 42; DVB Manual M-261, Ch. 5, § IV, Credit Standards.
84. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-19 (1970). FNMA is a secondary mortgage market for both conventional loans, id. § 1717(b)(2), and loans insured by FHA and VA, id. § 1717(b)(1). FNMA
purchases mortgages from commercial and savings banks.
85. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-59 (1970). FHLMC, like FNMA, buys conventional FHA and VA
mortgages, id. § 1454, but it deals primarily with federal savings and loan associations,
federal home loan banks and state chartered banks which are members of the Federal Home
Loan Bank system.
86. FNMA Conventional Selling Contract Supplement, § 701(s) (Nov. 1972).
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the terms of the note and mortgage." 8 The guidelines do not explain
the use of "reasonably" in this sentence or give examples of circumstances that would indicate that the income is stable.
FHLMC (Freddie Mac) has issued more specific rules to the
same effect:
If there are two borrowers both of whom have full time employment, a determination should be made as to whether both will probably work for several years
(normally at least 20% of the time).8

The guidelines permit discounting of fifty percent of one income,
however, when it judged that one person is likely to stop working
during the first few years of the mortgage. Significantly, temporary
maternity leave is exempted from that provision.
These guidelines will not abolish the practice of discounting a
wife's income unless FNMA and FHLMC check the practices of the
institutions with which they deal and refuse to buy loans from those
who discriminate. 89
3. Proposed FederalLegislation. Because the efficacy of existing judicial remedies and regulatory prohibitions of sex discrimination in the granting of credit remains uncertain, there has been
considerable activity in both houses of Congress aimed at providing
a comprehensive, effective remedy. On July 23, 1973, by a 90-0 vote,
the Senate unanimously passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act'
as an amendment to the Truth in Lending Act.' The Act includes
provisions of S.1605,92 introduced by Senator William Brock, and of
S.867,11 introduced by Senator Harrison Williams. The operative
language of the Senate Act is:
It shall be unlawful for any creditor or card issuer to discriminate on account
of sex or marital status against any individual with respect to the approval or
denial of any extension of consumer credit or with respect to the terms thereof
or with respect to the approval, denial, renewal, continuation, or revocation
of any open end consumer credit account or with respect to the terms thereof.
Section 104 of this title does not apply with respect to any transactions subject
to this section."

Section 10415 excepts credit for business or commercial purposes,
87. Id. § 311.03(c).
88. FHLMC-Sellers Guide Conventional, Part V, Credit Underwriting.
89. FNMA's guidelines are likely to be more effective than FHLMC's because of their
loans while FHLMC's clientele, the savings and loans, characteristically hold their mortgages
as investments.
90. S. 2101, Title III, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t (1970).
92. S. 1605, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
93. S. 867, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
94. S. 2101, Title III, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 181 (1973).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (1970).
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credit transactions of more than 25,000 dollars, and transactions in
securities or commodities accounts by a broker-dealer registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The removal of
these exceptions clearly strengthens the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, since the unavailability of business loans for women is becoming more evident.2
As an amendment to the Truth in Lending Act, the law would
be enforced through a number of federal agencies. The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System would be empowered to
issue regulations, including compliance guidelines, which would be
enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, with respect to most
consumer credit transactions. Other enforcement agencies would
include the United States Treasury Department, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
acting directly or through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Department of Agriculture and the Interstate
Commerce Commission.97
Fortunately, enforcement by this unwieldy conglomerate is
augmented by the Truth in Lending Act provision for civil liability.98 The existing law provides for a 100-dollar minimum recovery
for violations of the disclosure requirements of the Act. This minimum liability provision has caused courts to disallow class actions
rather than award 100 dollars to each member of an enormous class
and thereby ruin businesses for technical infringements of the law."
Therefore, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act amends the Truth in
Lending Act to allow a maximum recovery of 100,000 dollars or one
percent of the creditor's net worth, whichever is less in class action
suits.'0 " The Senate Committee believes this amendment is necessary to provide meaningful penalties that will induce compliance
with the law and which the courts will not be reluctant to impose.','
The Consumer Affairs Subcommittee of the House Banking
and Currency Committee currently has before it several bills that
96. Of 33,948 loans made by the Small Business Administration (SBA) in fiscal year
1973, only 123 went to women according to a synopsis of a study done for the SBA by Jeanne
Wertz, Women Entrepreneurs and SBA (March 21, 1973).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1970). Section 203 of S. 2101, Title II, however, would remove
the Interstate Commerce Commission and add the Farm Credit Administration.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
99. The leading case is Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
100. S. 2101, Title II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 208 (1973).
101. S. Rep. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1973).
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are similar to the one approved by the Senate.102 Chairwoman Leonor K. Sullivan of Missouri held hearings on the enforcement of
Truth in Lending over a period of months in 1973. During three days
of these hearings she asked members of the credit industry, government regulatory agencies and women or consumer advocates to
comment on the advisability of including in the House Truth in
Lending amendments a provision to protect women from credit discrimination. Comment was virtually unanimous in favor of a nondiscrimination provision, but industry representatives suggested
that problems would arise with prohibiting the consideration of
03
marital status in credit decisions.
Creditors have two basic concerns in regard to the marital status provisions. First, they consider marital status a valid indicator
of credit performance,' °4 in that divorced and separated people are
less apt to pay than are married people. They also argue that the
marriage relationship creates certain legal responsibilities between
spouses that must be taken into account in some credit transactions. 0 5 For example, a spouse's signature is needed if real property
is used for security in a state where an inchoate property interest
arises by operation of law.
Advocates of including marital status as a prohibited criterion
cite two reasons. Not only would such a rule protect the woman who
first applies for credit after she has been separated or divorced, 0 '
but it would also avoid the argument used by Hanover Manufacturers Trust in Hoberman that discounting a wife's income is not discrimination on the basis of sex because lenders are willing to dis102.

H.R. 5414, H.R. 5599, H.R. 10109, H.R. 10162, H.R. 10311, H.R. 10603, H.R. 10675.

The following bills have been referred to the Subcommittee on Bank Supervision and
Insurance: H.R. 248, H.R. 3210, H.R. 3375, H.R. 10824.
103. E.g., Statement of Harry N. Jackson on behalf of the National Retail Merchants
Association, Oversight Hearings, supra note 8 (Nov. 6, 1973); Statement of John 0. Zimmerman, President, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Oversight Hearings, id. (Oct. 30,
1973); Statement of Evan Houseworth on behalf of the American Bankers Association,
Oversight Hearings, id. (Oct. 30, 1973).
104. A survey of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board revealed that 64% of the savings
and loans admit using a person's marital status as a factor in evaluating the loan applications.
Eighteen percent indicated that marital status in and of itself could be grounds for automatic
disqualification. Federal Home Loan Bank Board Survey of 100 Savings and Loan Associations, Summer 1971.
105. Statement of Matthew Hale, Counsel for The American Bankers Association, hearings on the Availability of Credit to Women before the National Commission on Consumer
Finance (May 23, 1972); Statement of Edward Godwin on behalf of Mortgage Bankers of
America, Oversight Hearings,supra note 8 (Oct. 31, 1973).
106. Statement of Sharyn Campbell for the National Organization for Women,
Oversight Hearings, supra note 8 (Nov. 13, 1973).
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count the husband's income instead. '1 7

A related question raised by representatives of the credit industry is whether the proposed marital status provisions would be interpreted to preclude the creditor from inquiring about the marital
status of an applicant. They argue that they must know whether a
person is married in order to comply with certain state laws and to
protect their interest in collateral to which a spouse may have a
right.' 8 In addition to the community property and multiple agreement statutes, wage assignment laws, tenancy by the entirety, and
common-law dower are believed to require that a creditor know the
marital status of the applicant.
Twelve states have wage assignment laws requiring either
spouse to have the consent of the other before assigning his or her
wages as collateral for a debt.' 9 Seven other states require that a
husband, but not a wife, obtain the spouse's signature."'
At common law, husband and wife held property as tenants by
the entirety; neither alone could sever the tenancy or do anything
to defeat the other spouse's right of survivorship.' In the twentytwo states that retain this form of ownership, combinations of statutes and judicial interpretations determine the rights and obligations of the spouses and their relationship to creditors." ' 2 In order for
creditors to protect their interests in these states, they may need to
obtain the signatures of both spouses before the property can be
3
used as security.1

Common-law dower vests in the wife a life estate in one-third
of the real property acquired during marriage."' In the seventeen
states in which it still exists, if a husband alone executes a nonpur107. Statement of Margaret Gates, Co-Director, Center for Women Policy Studies,
Oversight Hearings, id. (Nov. 13, 1973).

108. Statement of John Dillon, Executive Vice President of National Bank Americard
(also representing Interbank), Oversight Hearings,id. (Oct. 30, 1973).
109. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-631 (Supp. 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. § 80-15-4 (1963);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 409-20 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 536.17 (Supp. 1973); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 9-3085 (1964); MD. CODE ANN. art. 8, § 6 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-144
(1943); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-25-33 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. § 8-2228 (1971); VA. CODE
§ 6.1-289 (1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.48.100 (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 214.15
(1957).
110. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-317 (1947); IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-208 (1965); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 154 §§ 2, 3 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.07 (1966); MONT.REV. CODES ANN. § 411506 (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. § 43-274 (1964); Wvo. STAT. § 27-202 (1957).
111. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 229-30 (1963).
112. Id. at 230-35.
113. For a detailed discussion, see Huber, Creditors'Rightsin Tenancies by the Entireties, 1 B. C. IND. COM. L. REV. 197 (1960).
114. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 220 (1968).
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chase money mortgage on his land, his wife's inchoate dower is
superior to the rights of the mortgagee.1 5 A husband is not, therefore, able to mortgage his property without his wife's signature."6
When common-law or modified curtesy exists" 7 or when dower has
been extended to cover both spouses," 8 a wife must likewise have
her husband's signature to convey real property."'
In these situations, the onus is upon the creditor to determine
whether the consent of the spouse is required. Should a federal law
prohibit him from attempting to learn a person's marital status, the
burden of the risk of accepting an invalid wage assignment or security interest in real property will be placed on the creditor.
Another problem creditors would confront under proposed federal legislation involves state property laws that limit the control a
married woman has over her property. The most obvious example
is the community property law of Louisiana, which deprives married
women of control over the community property, including their own
earnings.121 Under such a law a creditor might refuse a woman credit
because he could not expect to obtain a judgment against the community. Although this policy would reflect sound business practice,
it could be viewed as a violation of a law prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sex or marital status since the state laws which the
creditor would be relying on are themselves discriminatory.
Because no analogous case has been decided by the Supreme
Court, it is not clear what the result would be should a case challenging such a practice reach the courts. Even if the law or the
record evidenced the intent of Congress that such state laws be
preempted, the response of the judiciary could not be predicted. 2'
The federal courts have been reluctant to interfere with the operation of state property laws, particularly those which pertain to intrafamilial rights, 22 in order to assert a federal right under the Supremacy Clause.
115.

2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 209(2) (1973).

116.

1 id. § 119.

117.
118.

E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 25-101, -131 (Supp. 1970).
E.g., D. C. CODE ANN. § 19-102 (1973).
119. POWELL, supra note 115, at § 119.
120. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404 (West 1971).
121. But see remarks of Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan before the Consumer Federation of America reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. E 209 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1974) in which she
implies that Congress has the power to do so: "Some people suggest we solve the problem by
pre-empting all state laws dealing with husband-wife relationships, including dower and
curtesy, or the community property laws of Louisiana and several other states which give the
husband complete control over the disposition of a wife's earnings." Id. at E 210.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352. "Both theory and the preced-
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The credit industry is expected to oppose, in the House of
Representatives, a bill which subjects its members to these uncertainties. Proponents of such legislation may be forced to include a
provision that would protect creditors from this dilemma. Because
the problem arises in only a few states and because the offensive
state laws are already subject to attack on equal protection principles, advocates of the bill might consider this compromise.
V.

CONCLUSION

Sex discrimination in credit practices will not be eliminated by
revising state domestic relations or property laws. This is true because the offensive practices are not, as has been suggested, dictated
by the law. They are, rather, the result of erroneous or outmoded
notions of women's role in society.
Women need an effective legal remedy for credit discrimination. Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have laws,
most of which were enacted in the past year, that address this problem, but few of them are comprehensive enough or well enough
enforced to be effective. Although credit practices may be attacked
on equal protection grounds, no such case has yet been decided.
The federal financial regulatory agencies could promulgate and
enforce rules forbidding discrimination, but to date only the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board has done so. The federal credit bill,'2 which
has been approved by the Senate, would require that these and
other agencies regulate the credit industry with respect to discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status. It would also permit
aggrieved persons or a class to sue in federal court for damages.
Whatever credit legislation is finally approved by the Congress
should provide for both courses of action. Only a strong, well enforced federal law, accompanied by efforts to educate both consumers and the credit industry, can be expected to overcome a tradition
of discrimination and guarantee that women get the credit they
deserve.
ents of this Court teach us solicitude for state interests, particularly in the field of family and
family-property arrangements. They should be overridden by the federal courts only where
clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damages if the state law is
applied."
123. S. 2102, Title III, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973).
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APPENDIX A
A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS

Wife's Earnincs

A
R
I
Z
0
N
A

C
A
L
I
F

Wife's Personal
Injury Recoveries

Management of
Community

Power Over Community

Remain part of
community.

Remain part of
community,

ARiz. Rev. STAT.
§ 25-211 (Supp. 1973)

AaIz. REv. STAT.
§ 25.211 (Supp. 1973)

Each spouse has equal
management, control, and
disposition rights, and
equal power to bind the
community.

Each spouse has equal
power to control, manage.
dispose of. or bind
community peronalty.

AIuz. Rev. STAT.
§ 2.5-214 (Supp. 1973)

Aiuz. REV.STAT.
§ 25-214 (Supp. 1973)
Husband may sell or encumber it without wife's
consent, except dispo.
sition of furnishings of
the home or her clothing
requires her written con.
sent.

Personalty

Remain part of community,
but she may control them
unless she commingles them
with community property
managed by her husband,

Same as earnings, except husband may reimburse himself or the
community for wife's
medical expenses.

Husband is exclusive
manager, but wife may
manage whole community
to the extent necessary to
support her children,

R
N
I
A

CAL.CIV.CODE
§ 5124 (West 1970)

CAL.CIV.CODe
§ 5124 (West 1970)

CAL.CIv. CODe
§§5125 (Vest 1970)
5127.5 (Supp. 1974)

I
D
A
H
0

Remain part of community,
but she may control them.

Remain part of community,
under husband's control,

Husband is exclusive
manager.

IDAHO
CODe§ 32-913 (1963)

Labonte v. Davidson, 31
Idaho 644, 175 P. 588
(1915)

IDAHO
CODe§ 32-912
(1963)

Wife's separate property
(Husband's are community
property),

Husband is exclusive
manager.

Husband may sell or en.
cumber it or give it away
without wife's consent.

Civ. CODearts. 2402,
2334 (West 1971)

LA.CIv. CODe
art. 2404
(West 1971)

LA.CiV.CODe
art. 2404
(West 1971)

If wife sues alone,
recovery is her separate
property.

Husband is exclusive
manager.

Husband may sell or en.
cumber it or give it
away without wife's
consent.

O

CAL.CIv. CODe
§ 5125 (West 1970)
Husband may sell or en.
cumber it without wife's
consent.
IDAHO
CODe§ 32-912 (1963)

L

0
U
I
S
1LA.
A
N
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Remain part of community.
LA.CIV.CODeart. 2404
(West 1971)

When one spouse gives
written authority to the
other to use her/his own
earnings, they are considered a gift from the
one spouse to the other and
are considered separate
property. Otherwise, she
has control of her own
earnings when using them
for care of family.
NEV. REv. STAT.123.190,
123.230 (1973)

NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 41.170 (1973)

NeV. Rev. STAT.
§ 123.230 (1973)

NEV. REv. STAT.
(1973)
§ 123.230
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Division of Community

Pou er Over Community
Realty

Post.Separation
Accumulations

Joinder is required for
acquisition, disposition, or
encumbrance of an interest in
real property.

Remain part of community.
Aaiz. R v. STAT.

Alimony

Upon Divorce

§ 25-211,

213 (Supp. 1973)

Amz. Rev. STAT.§ 25-214(c)
(Supp. 1973)

Husband has sole management
right, but joinder of wife
is required before he can
encumber or convey it.

Both wife's and husband's
are separate property.

Subject to a few exceptions, the community
must be divided equally.

CAL.CIv. CODE§ 5118
(Supp. 1974)

Available to both spouses.
CAt. CIV.CODE§ 4801
(Supp. 1974)

CAL.Crv. CODE
§ 4800 (West 1970)
§ 4800(b)(1) (Supp. 1974)

Cal, Civ. Code § 5127
(West 1970)

Husband has sole management
right, but joinder of wife
is required before he can encumber or convey it.
IDAHOCODE§ 32-912 (1963)

Husband has sole management
right and joinder of wife is
required only when he is dealing
with the family homestead.
LA. CIV.COnE art. 2404
(West 1971)

Husband has sole management

right, but joinder of wife
is required before he can encumber or convey it. Either
spouse may give the other, by
written power of attorney, the
complete power over community
real property.
NEv. Rev. STAT.123.230 (1973)

Wife's are separate
property; husband's are
community property.

Community is divided
equally or
as the court deems just.

Available only to wives.
IDAHOCODE§ 32-704 (1963)

IDAHOCODE§ 32-712
IDAHO
CODE§ 32-909 (1963) (1963)

Wife's are separate property; husband's are community property.

Community must be divided equally.

Available only to wives
and limited to 1/3
husband's income.

LA. CIV. CODEart. 2334
(West 1971)

LA. CIV. CODEart. 2406
(West 1971)

LA. CIv. Cone art. 160
(West Supp. 1974)

Wife's are separate prop-

Community is divided ac-

Available only to wives.

erty; husband's are community property.

cording to what is just
and equitable.

Nzv. Rev. STAT.
§ 123.180 (1973)

NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 125.150(1) (1973)

NEv. R v. STAT.
§ 125.150 (1973)
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N
E
W

Remain part of community.

Remain part of community.

N.M. STAT.ANN.

N.M. STAT.ANN.

M
E
X

§ 57-4A-2 (Supp. 1973)

§ 57-4A-2 (Supp. 1973)

be sole manager of commercial community personal property, unless
wife assumes her rights
in writing.
§ 57-4A-7.1 (Supp. 1973)

named in a document Gf
title or a written agree.
ment with a third party
may manage the named
personalty.
§ 57-4A.8 (Supp. 1973)

Remain part of community,
but she may control
them,

Those attributable to
loss of earning capacity
are community property;
the rest are separate
property. Injured spouse
has control of both.
'rEx. FASniy CODE§ 5.01,
5.22 (1973)

Each spouse has sole man.
agement rights over that
part of the community
each would have owned if
single, and they have
joint powers over the
rest of the community.
TEx. FASULYCODE§ 5.22
(1973)

If husband is sole wage.
eamer, he may sell or
encumber it or give it
away without wife's
consent.
TEx. FAMLYCODE.
§ 5.22(a) (1973)

Remain part of community,
except, if recovered from
husband, wife may keep some
as separate property.

Each spouse has equal
Each spouse has equal
power to manage & control, power to manage, control,
community.
and bind it.

Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.
2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972)

WASH.Rev. CODE§ 26.16.
030 (Supp. 1972)

I
C

o
T
E
X
A
S

TEx. FAMILY
CODE
§ 5.22(a)(1) (1973)

Spouses have equal powers Either spouse alone has
of management, except
full management powers,
husband is presumed to
except only the spouses

W
Remain part of community.
WASH.REv. CODE
§ 26.16.030 (Supp. 1972)

,VsH. REv. CoDE
§ 26.16.0.30 (Supp.

2)
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Joinder required for all conveyances or mortgages except
purchae-money mortgages.
§ 57-4A-7 (Supp. 1973)
...............
Joinder of both spouses required %hen both names are
found on document of title.
§57-4A-8 (Supp. 1973)
Joinder of wife required if
property under joint control
or for homestead.

Remain part of community. Unequal division of cornmunity "especially suitable for the needs of
N.M. STAT.ANN.
each" spouse is allowed
§ 574A-2 (Supp. 1973)
upon divorce.

TEx. FAMILY
CODE§ 5,22,

56.81 (1973)

When husband is managing,
wife must join before he
can sell, encumber, or convey it.
WASH.
Rsv. CODE
§ 26.16.030(3)
(Supp. 1972)

Sparks v. Sparks, 84
N.M. 267, 502 P.2d 292
(1972)
Remain part of community. Community is divided as
court deems just and
TEx. FAMILY
CODE
right.
§ 5.22 (1973)

Available to both spouses.
N.M. STAT.ANN.
§ 22-7-13 (Supp. 1973)

No permanent alimony-only
temporary alimony and permanent support pursuant to
agreement between spouses.

Tnx. FLMLY CODE

§ 3.63 (1973)

Both wife's and husband's Community is divided acare separate property.
cording to what is just,
equitable and right.
WASH.
REv. CODE
§ 26.16.140
(Supp. 1972)
WASH.
Plv. COD
§ 26.08.110 (1961)

TEx. FAMILY
ConE
§ 3.59 (1973)

Available to both spouses.
WASH.Rev. CODE
§ 26.08.110 (1961)
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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX B
State Credit Laws

State

None

ALABAMA

ALASKA

What Protected

Date

1972

Public Accommodations
ALASKASTAT.§ 18.80.230
(Supp. 1972)

Sex

Home Finance Statute
ALASKASTAT.§ 18.80.250
(Supp. 1972)

Sex

None

ARIZONA

None

ARKANSAS
CAUFORNIA

10-1-73

Credit Statute
CAL.CITY. CODE§ 1812.30
(Supp. 1973)

Sex
Married women's
uncommingled or
separate property

COLORADd

6-7-73

Consumer Statute
COLO.REv. STAT.9 73-1-109
(SuPP. 1973)
HOUSINGSTATUTE
COLO.Rrv. STAT.§ 69-7-5
(Supp. 1973)

Sex

6-14-73

CONNECTICUT

6-13-73

Credit Statute
Public Act # 73-573

Sex and Marital
Status

Sex and Marital
Status

None

DELAWARE
DISTRICT OF

COLMUiRA

11-16-73

Human Rights Law
Title 34 D.C. RULESAND
REns. (1973)

Sex and Marital
Status

FLORIDA

10-1-73

Anti-Discrimination Statute
FLA.SEss. LAWSCh. 73-251
(1973)

Sex and Marital
Status

*

GEORGIA
HAWAII

*

IDAHO
ILLINOIS

1973

*

IOWA
1972

Anti-Discrimination Act
K.S.A. §§ 44-1017, 44-1009 (C)
(1972)

KENTUCKY
LOUISIANA
MAINE

Sex and Marital
Status

None

INDIANA

KANSAS

Credit Card Statute
ILL.ANN. STAT.Ch. 121 1/2
§ 385.1 (Smith-Hurd 1973)

None

Sex

1974]

WOMEN AND CREDIT

To 97zat/17iorm Statute Applies

Enforcement Provisions

Public Accommodations

Administrative Remedy

Home Financing

Administrative Remedy

Obtainance of money, property, labor, or services on a deferred
payment basis; credit reporting agency must, upon written
request, identify in report credit history of each spouse
and of their joint accounts.

Private right of action-actual damages + $250.
Injunctive relief

Consumer credit sale, lease, loan by seller, lessor, lender whose
unpaid balance from previous year exceeds $1 million,

Private right of action-actual damages but not less than $100 or
more than $1,000 + costs and attorney's fees.

Home financing

Any creditor

Administrative remedy-Commission of Human Rights and
Opportunities

Home financing
Public accommodations

Administrative remedy-Office of Human Rights or Private right
of action-damages.

Loaning money, granting credit

Private right of action-compensatory + punitive damages
+ attorney's fees.

Issuing credit cards; must consider financial status of couple
if requeted; must consider individual's status if requested to
issue card to individual.

None

Public accommodations
Home financing

Administrative remedy-Commission on Civil Rights.
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MA R

rYLAD

MASSACHUSETTS

7-1-73

Credit Statute
MD. CODEANN. art. 83, §§ 128(e)
& 153C(b)
Home Financing Statute
MD. CODEANN. art. 48B, § 23(a) (1973)

Sex and Marital
Status

1973

Credit and Services Statute
MAss. GEN. LAws Ch. 151B, § 4(14)

Sex and Marital
Status

8-1-73

Human Rights Act
MINN. STAT. §§ 363.03.2(3)
& 363.03.7 (1973)

Sex and Marital
Status
Sex

MICHIGAN
MINNESOTA

None

MIssIssIppI
MISSOURI
MONTANA

None

NEaRASKA

None

NEVADA

None
None

NEw HAMPSHIRE
NEw JERSEY

1972

Civil Rights Statute
N.J. STAT.ANN. § 10.5-12
(Supp. 1973)

1973

Banking Commission Directive
None

NEWMEXICO
NEW YORK

Sex and Marital
Status

2-6-74

N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 296-a

Noam CAROLINA

None

NoRsH DAKOTA

None

Sex and Marital
Status

OHIO
OKLAHOMA

OREGON

10-73

Public Accommodation Statute
O.R.S. § 30.670 (1973)

Sex and Marital
Status

5-11-73

RI. GEN. LAWS§ 34-37-4.1
(Supp. 1973)

Sex and Marital
Status

PENNSYLVANIA
RHODE ISLAND

None

SOUTH CAROLINA

SOUTHDAKOTA

TENNESSEE

1972

Human Relations Act
S.D.C.L. §§ 20-13-21, 20-13-23
(Supp. 1973)

Sex
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Retail credit accounts; consumer credit; amends married
women's property act to specifically include retail credit
accounts home financing.

Administrative remedy, Commission of Small Loans may issue
cease and desist orders-no personal recovery.

Unlawful to deny, terminate credit or adversely affect credit
standing.

Private right of action-actual damages; if no actual damages,
special damages of not more than $1,000 + attorney's fees.
Administrative remedy-Commission Against Discrimination.

Home financing
Extension of credit

Administrative remedy-Department of Human Rights

Public accommodations; mortgage lenders
Prohibiting inquiries into birth control practices of bank
credit applicant.

Administrative remedy-Division on Civil Rights.

Creditors, lenders, insurers

Administrative remedy-complaint to Superintendent of
Banks or Attorney General.

Legislative intent to prohibit discriminatory credit
practices.

Private right of action-compensatory + punitive damages
+ attorney's fees or file complaint with Commissioner of
Bureau of Labor.

Financial organizations and credit granting commercial
institutions.

Administrative remedy

Public accommodations; consumer credit; home financing.

Administrative remedy.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

TExAs

8-27-73

Credit Statute
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Sex

Tzx. REv. Civ. STAT.ANN.

art. 5069-2.07 (Supp. 1974)
UTAH

58-73

Civil Rights Act
UTAH
CoDE AN. § 13-7-3
(Supp. 1973)

Sex

VEaMOrr

2-12-74

Credit Statute
8 V.S.A. § 1211, 9 V.S.A.
§§ 2362 & 2410

Sex and Marital
Status

VIRGINIA

WASHINGTON

None

6-7-73

Anti-Discrimination Statute
WASH.Rv. CODEANN. § 49.60.5

Sex and Marital
Status

(Supp. 1973)
WESTVIRGINIA

Human Rights Statute

Sex

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-9(f)
(Supp. 1973)
WISCONSIN

8-4-73

Credit Statute
WIsc. STAT.ANN. § 138.20

Sex and Marital
Status

(Cumm. Supp. 1973)
WYOMING

None

* Indicates that some legislation on the subject of women and credit has been introduced into the state legislature.
**Pennsylvania Department of Banking has promulgated proposed nondiscrimination regulations.
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Creditors, lenders

Private right of action-actual damages or $50, whichever is
greater + court costs.

Places of public accommodation; enterprises regulated by the
state, including all institutions subject to regulation under the
Utah Uniform Commercial Credit Code.

Private right of action for damages; violators will be considered
public nuisances and may be enjoined in a suit brought by the
Attorney General.

Lending institutions, retail installment contracts, retail
charge accounts.

License may be suspended.

Deny open or closed end credit transaction.

Private right of action-injunctive relief, actual damages &
costs and attorney's fees; administrative remedyHuman Rights.

Public accommodations

Administrative remedy

Financial organizations or any other credit granting
commercial institution.

$1,000 fine

